Inductive Game Theory and the Dynamics of Animal Conflict by DeDeo, Simon et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
00
6.
54
69
v1
  [
q-
bio
.PE
]  
28
 Ju
n 2
01
0
1
Inductive Game Theory and the Dynamics of Animal Conflict
Simon DeDeo1,2, David C. Krakauer1, Jessica C. Flack1,3,∗
1 Santa Fe Institute, Santa Fe, NM 87501, USA
2 Institute for the Physics and Mathematics of the Universe, University of Tokyo,
Kashiwa-shi, Chiba 277-8582, Japan
3 Yerkes National Primate Research Center, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322, USA
∗ E-mail: jflack@santafe.edu
Abstract
Conflict destabilizes social interactions and impedes cooperation at multiple scales of biological organiza-
tion. Of fundamental interest are the causes of turbulent periods of conflict. We analyze conflict dynamics
in a monkey society model system. We develop a technique, Inductive Game Theory, to extract directly
from time-series data the decision-making strategies used by individuals and groups. This technique uses
Monte Carlo simulation to test alternative causal models of conflict dynamics. We find individuals base
their decision to fight on memory of social factors, not on short timescale ecological resource competition.
Furthermore, the social assessments on which these decisions are based are triadic (self in relation to
another pair of individuals), not pairwise. We show that this triadic decision making causes long con-
flict cascades and that there is a high population cost of the large fights associated with these cascades.
These results suggest that individual agency has been over-emphasized in the social evolution of complex
aggregates, and that pair-wise formalisms are inadequate. An appreciation of the empirical foundations
of the collective dynamics of conflict is a crucial step towards its effective management.
Author Summary
Persistent conflict is one of the most important contemporary challenges to the integrity of society and
to individual quality of life. Yet surprisingly little is understood about conflict. Is resource scarcity and
competition the major cause of conflict, or are other factors, such as memory for past conflicts, the drivers
of turbulent periods? How do individual behaviors and decision-making rules promote conflict? To date,
most studies of conflict use simple, elegant models based on game theory to investigate when it pays to
fight. Although these models are powerful, they have limitations: they require that both the strategies
used by individuals and the costs and benefits, or payoffs, of these strategies are known, and they are tied
only weakly to real-world data. Here we develop a new method, Inductive Game Theory, and apply it to
a time series gathered from detailed observation of an actual primate system. We are able to determine
which types of behavior are most likely to generate periods of intense conflict, and we find that fights
are not explained by single, aggressive individuals, but by complex interactions among groups of three
or higher. Understanding how memory and strategy affect conflict dynamics is a crucial step towards
designing better methods for prediction, management and control.
Introduction
Conflict is dissipative. Organisms, aggregates, and societies must overcome the destabilizing consequences
of conflict in order to persist [1–5]. Conflict consequently plays a central role in the evolution of social
organization. Particularly problematic for social stability is ontogenetic conflict – conflict that finds
expression in fights between individuals over the course of their lifetimes. Much is understood about
control mechanisms [4–11], factors driving escalation of pair-wise contests [12–15], the influence of third
parties on conflict outcome through coalition formation [16, 17], audience [18, 19] and reputation effects
[20], and redirected aggression [21]. Somewhat paradoxically, less is understood about the causes of
2conflict, and almost nothing is known about the dynamics of multiparty conflict –conflicts that spread
to involve more than two individuals to encompass a sizable fraction of a group. Multiparty conflicts are
common in many gregarious individual societies [22]. In these systems, it is often difficult to establish
why individuals become involved in an ongoing fight or why the fight started.
A standard assumption is that individual strategies are highly tuned to resource competition. Under
this assumption the cause of any single conflict is immediate competition for resources over short time
intervals. The probability of fighting depends directly on the payoff obtained from acquiring the resource
in the present. These resources can include food, mates and dominance status. The latter is thought
to improve access to food and mates. However, individual memory for previous interactions can alter
the occurrence and course of future conflicts, promoting longer-timescale, competitive dynamics. This
is because memory for regular patterns of past conflict facilitates prediction of future conflict, allowing
individuals to respond strategically. It is well understood, for example, that competition for dominance
between a pair of individuals can be played out over many months and involve alliances and coalitions [23].
Memory can also introduce costs, as it can lead to the amplification of conflict or to the eruption of a
sequence of related fights: a “cascade” [24, 25]. Such turbulent periods can increase the probability of
injury and stress, both of which are associated with increased mortality [26]. Large conflicts can increase
the probability that individuals not involved in an initial dispute will be drawn in, and so can increase
the “population cost” of conflict. Thus critical questions include: how do individuals decide to fight,
are multiparty conflicts are reducible to pair-wise interactions or do they involve irreducible higher-order
interactions. How do alternative decision-making rules, or strategies, effect inter-conflict dynamics and
organizational stability, and what role does memory play in amplifying and dampening conflict?
Addressing these questions in multiplayer systems requires models that make few or no assumptions
about payoffs, as these are rarely known, and which are tractable when allowing for higher-order inter-
actions (more than pairwise interactions). In standard game theory models – a canonical approach to
the study of conflict – payoffs are posited, higher order strategic interactions are typically neglected, and
data rarely derive from temporally resolved, natural observations of strategic interactions. The goal is
to provide solution concepts for games that find uninvadible strategies, rather than to extract from the
data directly those strategies individuals are playing [27].
To complement these standard deductive game theoretic approaches, we introduce Inductive Game
Theory, in which the strategies used by individuals, and their consequences for social dynamics, are derived
computationally from highly resolved time-series data on competitive processes. Methodologically, this
approach borrows from statistical inference methods now standard in genetics. The goal in genetics is
typically to reconstruct gene interactions from expression-profile, time-series. The problem is that the
number of transcripts is usually far greater than the number of independent observations. Hence priors
need to be imposed on permissible solutions. The goal of Inductive Game Theory is to extract decision-
making strategies and behavioral time series from known interaction networks. Hence these problems are
in some sense inverse of each other. In the Discussion, we return to this issue, expanding the scope of
IGT to consider non-conflict time series.
In the body of the paper we develop the inductive game theory approach and apply it to a conflict
data set from a pigtailed macaque (Macaca nemestrina) group. The macaque (Macaca) genus and its
subset species are natural model systems for studying the role of complex conflict dynamics in social
evolution. This is because in macaque societies individual decision making is plastic and guided by
learning, conflict is frequent and typically involves multiple, unrelated players, and social dynamics occur
over multiple timescales [28, 29]. The particular pigtailed macaque group we study contains 48 socially-
mature individuals (84 individuals in total) housed socially in a large compound at the Yerkes National
Primate Research Center Field Station in Lawrenceville, Georgia (see Empirical Methods.) Data were
collected over a series of four months in which the group was stable (no reversals in dominance status).
Conflict events – “fights” – in this group vary in duration, number of participants, and other measures
of severity [4, 9]. Because the entire sequence of conflict events was collected, including data on fight
3duration, participant identity, and participant behavior, we are able to construct a highly-resolved time-
series for each observation period. A total of 1,096 fights in 158 hours were observed over the study
period; the names of individuals in each fight were recorded.
Time Series Correlations
We begin by asking whether fight sizes are correlated in time. An example time-series, from a single eight-
hour observation period and showing fight size and duration, is in Fig. 1; one may construct from this
various autocorrelation functions. Surprisingly, the sizes of fights are nearly uncorrelated over the course
of the day. Larger-than-average fights do not, for example, predict the appearance of larger-than-average
fights later. This is discussed in greater detail in the Supporting Information.
We then ask whether there are correlations across fights in membership – does the the appearance of
individual A in a fight at time step one predict the appearance of B in the next fight? For simplicity, the
only within-fight information we use is individual identity data; we do not take into account individual
behavior (e.g., aggressor, recipient, intervener, and so forth – see Empirical Methods), nor do we consider
which individuals interacted within fights. Given this, the simplest correlations we can observe are
correlations in membership across fights separated by one peace bout. We write these P (A → B),
estimated as N(B|A)/N(A): the number of fights involving B that followed a fight involving A, divided
by the number of fights involving A. Informally, P (A → B) gives the probability of observing B in a
conflict given that one has just observed a conflict involving A.
The probabilities will vary for different pairs of individuals. In order to remove time-independent
effects on individual participation in fights, we compute ∆P (A → B); the difference between the null-
expected P and that measured from the data:
∆P (A→ B) =
N(B|A)−Nnull(B|A)
N(A)
, (1)
where Nnull(B|A) is the average from a large Monte Carlo set of null models generated by time-shuffling
the series but not shuffling identities within fights. Fig. 2 shows some of the strongest correlations of this
form found between the 48 individuals, in the form of a directed graph.
Correlations across fights can also be generated by subgroups deciding to fight in response to other
subgroups fighting previously. There are several possible variations in subgroup-generated correlations.
We consider only the two computationally simplest correlational structures. Correlations of the form
∆P (AB → C) reveal the extent to which the presence or absence of a pair of individuals at one time
predicts the appearance of a particular individual at the next step. They can be defined:
∆P (AB → C) =
N(C|AB)−Nnull(C|AB)
N(AB)
, (2)
as can ∆P (A→ BC), the extent to which the presence of an individual at the previous step predicts the
presence of a pair at the next step:
∆P (A→ BC) =
N(BC|A)−Nnull(BC|A)
N(A)
, (3)
Using this combinatorial Monte Carlo technique, we find significant correlations for both these structures.
Plots of the distribution of these three correlations can be found in the Supporting Information. As one
measures higher-level correlations, between, for example, triplets and individuals, the effective sample
size – number of relevant observations (the conditional N(x|y) and Nnull(x|y)) – drops, while the number
of parameters to estimate rises combinatorically. This leads to a rapid decrease in signal-to-noise on any
one observable.
4Extracting overall significance levels for ∆P measurements requires caution. For example, since
individuals are correlated within fights, and these correlations are maintained by the null model, the
various ∆P measurements are not independent of each other. A Monte Carlo simulation of the expected
numbers of correlations confirms that the excess of positive ∆P values in the observed data is significant
at p < 0.001; these issues are discussed in greater detail in the Supporting Information.
A similar analysis can be done for two-step correlations between named individuals and groups; while
individual detections can be made, Monte Carlo simulations of the expected noise properties of the ∆P
measurement suggest that such correlations, should they exist, are too weak to detect even in the full
sample of 1096 fights.
The Space of Strategies
Given the observed correlations, we now consider the causal mechanisms underlying the detectable indi-
vidual and subgroup correlations. To do so, we introduce a class of minimal models for social reasoning, or
“strategy space.” Full specification of these models is in the Supporting Information section, “Simulation
Specification.”
We suppose that each individual or subgroup decides whether to join a fight based on composition of
the previous fight. The space of possible strategies can then be written as C(n,m), where n is the size
of the relevant group in the previous fight, and m is the number of individuals making the decision. We
allow decisions to be probabilistic (“mixed,” in the game theory terminology), so that a particular fight
composition can lead, with some probability distribution, to different kinds of subsequent fights.
Each element of a C(n,m) strategy is a number between +1 and −1, specifying the probability that
the appearance of a particular n-tuple leads to a recommendation that a particular m-tuple join, or
avoid, the next fight. These probabilities derive directly from the data, using the equations given in the
previous section to determine whether there is a significant identify correlation across fights between two
individuals or pairs. A negative value can be interpreted as repulsion or inhibition, and a positive value
can be interpreted as attraction or stimulation.
In the case that a particular m-tuple receive multiple, possibly incompatible, recommendations to
join or avoid, which is always possible because each fight has a minimum of two individuals involved, the
decision to join or avoid can be resolved by introducing a temperament parameter, which we call a “com-
binator.” We choose AND and OR to capture the two ends of the spectrum of individual temperaments.
Under the conflict averse, or conservative AND combinator, an m-tuple must receive recommendations to
join from all relevant n-tuples. Under the maximally conflict-prone OR combinator, a single recommen-
dation to join is sufficient.
We begin with a randomly generated, spontaneous “seed” pair. These seeds can trigger a subsequent
series of fights (a “cascade”) that in our simulation build up a time series. At some point, a particular
fight may lead to no recommendations to join, or a recommendation that only a single individual join; at
this point, the cascade ends, and a new seed pair is chosen.
This is a (one-step) Markov model; the restriction to single, as opposed to multi-step models can be
justified in part by the absence of detectable correlations at two steps, discussed above, and by the repro-
duction of this absence in the outputs of the one-step model. Different C(n,m) and combinator choices
amount to constraining the 248×248 transition matrix. The estimation of maximum-likelihood transition
probabilities in (hidden) Markov models is often accomplished with a variant of the EM algorithm [30];
however, even in the simplest model, C(1, 1), the number of parameters (482 = 2304) to be estimated
is larger than the number of events (1096 fights), and so such iterative methods are unlikely to reliably
converge.
On the other hand, determining the parameters directly by searching the full parameter space is
impossible. In this exploratory work, we instead make a convenient Ansatz. Specifically, we take the
elements of C(n,m) to be equal to the corresponding measurement of the ∆P between the relevant n-
5and m-tuple. In the discussion of results (“How Specific are the Strategies”), we consider a number of
alterations from this first guess as a way to assess the flatness of the likelihood and thus to suggest, for
future investigations, how to reduce the dimensionality of the parameter space.
Our choice should be reasonably close to the maximum of the likelihood when fights are small and do
not grow or shrink too quickly. We find that some choices of strategy class both “validate” (approximately
reproduce the ∆P measurements used to specify them) and “predict” (reproduce other features of the
data that do not directly influence the values of their parameters.)
As shown in Fig. 3 we can define a systematic, discrete space of C(n,m) models that stand in hi-
erarchical relation to one another. Increases in n correspond to an increase in the memory capacity of
decision makers. Increases in m correspond to an increase in coordination among individuals. Hence the
space defines an hierarchy of memory and information processing requirements. We confine the space
of models we consider to those in which n ≤ 2 and m ≤ 2, as the strategies of higher-order models are
unlikely to be within the cognitive capabilities of the individuals. In principle, C(n,m) can be extended
systematically to (i) larger values of n and m, (ii) include a combinator with more complicated functional
dependence, and (iii) accommodate longer timescales, for example, by expanding the dimension of the
strategy space from C(n,m) to C(n,m, p), and even C(n,m, p, z), where p and z respectively refer to the
second and third time steps from the initial fight. Later in the Results section, we consider how factors
like power [4] affect strategy use by individuals. Such factors can be incorporated into the IGT framework
but caution is warranted as it is nontrivial to do so systematically; we defer this question to future work.
Three Hypotheses
We consider C(1, 1), C(2, 1) and C(1, 2), with either combinator. Thus each hypothesis has two variants.
C(1, 1) includes only pair-wise decision making strategies that do not require any coordination be-
tween conflict participants fighting in the second time-step. We call this the Rogue Actor Hypothesis
– an individual’s involvement in a conflict provokes others to become involved in subsequent conflicts.
Rejection of this model would suggest that individuals – by either appearing in many fights themselves
or by repeatedly provoking others – are not the primary cause of fights or cascades.
C(2, 1) means that an individual decides to participate in a subsequent conflict based on the presence
or absence of a particular pair of individuals in the previous bout. This model includes triadic-decision
making strategies. Rejection of this model would rule out what we call the Triadic Discrimination
Hypothesis – individuals make strategic decisions about whether to engage in the present conflict based
on who fought with whom previously, and their strategic relation to that pair.
C(1, 2) means that the decision of a pair of individuals to participate in a subsequent conflict is based
on the presence or absence of a particular individual in the previous bout. This model includes triadic
decision-making strategies that additionally require coordination of participants in the second time-step.
Rejection of this model would rule out what we call the Triadic Coordination Hypothesis – individuals
jointly decide to fight in a subsequent bout based on the presence of a particular individual in the previous
bout, and their strategic relation to that individual.
Higher-order strategies are in general irreducible – not decomposable into the products of lower-order
strategies. In the language of statistical inference, C(1, 1) is nested within the other two strategies;
imposing equality constraints allows them to approximate C(1, 1). With these three hypotheses in hand,
we can produce simulations of the empirical time series, whose predictions we analyze below.
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Conflict Size
We test these hypotheses against each other by simulating conflict dynamics using the C(n,m) models.
We run one simulation for each C(n,m)+combinator model. We ask how well each of the resulting
simulated distributions of fight sizes fits the empirical distribution; the total number of simulated fights
is at least 100 times larger than that observed, allowing Monte Carlo estimates of the statistical properties
of observable parameters.
The simulations tell us three things. One is the implication of each C(n,m) model and its associated
strategies for conflict dynamics, including cascade severity. Another is which of the models better repro-
duces the data, and thus which of the C(n,m) strategies individuals and subgroups are more likely to be
playing in the group. A third insight given by the simulations is how much information the individuals
are using, when playing a particular strategy, about other individuals and their interactions.
We operationalize conflict size using a measure we call the “long fraction” (Fig. 4). The long fraction
is the number of fights of size i, divided by the total number of fights larger than two; formally,
LF (i) =
N(i)
∑48
j=3N(j)
, (4)
where N(i) is the number of fights of size i; the maximum fight size of 48 comes from the total number
of socially-mature individuals in the group. The long fraction is a measure of cascade severity, showing
how large fights can grow due to the combined strategies of individuals and subgroups. We consider only
fights larger than two in size in order to reduce the influence of seed pair composition on the analysis.
As shown in Fig. 4, the most striking feature of the simulations is the vastly different conflict sizes
generated by the different strategies. In the cases considered, these differences allow us to quickly rule out
certain simple models. Two of the variants we consider, C(1, 1)+AND and C(1, 1)+OR, lead to “anomalous
quiescence” – few fights are sufficiently motivating to the group to be consequential. Even if a small
conflict manages to double in size, it is rarely able to double again.
We find that in three cases the models lead to “forest fires” – conflict expands in a cascade that engulfs
the group, with nearly all individuals participating, and refuses to die down. These are C(2, 1)+OR,
C(1, 2)+OR, and C(1, 2)+AND. These strategies do not reproduce the data. Since neither combinator for
C(1, 2) works, we rule out the Triadic Coordination Hypothesis.
Only C(2, 1)+AND reproduces the distribution of fight sizes. This supports the Triadic Discrimination
Hypothesis – individuals decide to fight based on their relation to pairs in previous fights. A small surplus
of fights in the data at the very largest fight sizes (≥ 10) suggests that strategies of other models might
come into play at these extremes.
This might happen, for example, if during turbulent periods individuals form coalitions in response
to the perceived coalitions of others – C(2, 2). However, the frequency with which this model is used is
likely to be low given it requires a level of coordination made difficult by constraints imposed by spatial
considerations and limited capacity for communication [31] among the individuals in individual societies.
Model C(2, 1) on the other hand does not require coordination.
The Triadic models, and C(2, 1)+AND in particular, have (formally) many more parameters than the
Rogue Actor Hypotheses. A study of the comparative Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values, an
information theoretic criterion that includes a penalty for model complexity, shows that the improvement
in goodness-of-fit is sufficient to compensate; this is discussed in detail in Supporting Information.
As we noted earlier, the autocorrelation function finds no significant fight size correlations; our model
also reproduces this feature. Below we consider a wider range of observables to see how well the Triadic
model performs.
7Conflict Cost
We find in our simulations that the different C(n,m) strategies have different implications for cascade size
– the pairwise strategies produce small cascades, whereas the triadic strategies produce longer cascades,
with the conflict prone variants producing the longest. Here we show, using data taken simultaneously
with the time series, that in addition to the assumed costs and benefits to individuals from playing a
particular strategy (e.g., that triadic strategies allow individuals to strategically respond to the inter-
actions of others, whereas pair-wise strategies allow no such social “tuning”), there is a group cost to
playing strategies that produce large fights. (We refer the reader to the Empirical Methods for important
operational definitions and statistical methods used in this section.)
We consider two measures of group cost. These measures capture how likely an individual is to receive
aggression given the eruption of a conflict in size class i. The first is the (population) mean frequency of
contact aggression (e.g., tumbling, wrestling, biting) received by group members during fights in size class,
Xi. The second is the (population) mean frequency of redirected aggression (e.g., aggression directed by
a conflict participant to a third party) received by group members during fight in size class, Yi. The total
number of fights in size class i is given by Fi. The total number of fights in size class i in which individual
j receives contact aggression is xij and redirected aggression, yij . The aforementioned population-level
means are then, Xi =
1
48Fi
∑
j xij and Yi =
1
48Fi
∑
j yij . For all large fights (fights size > 4) L =
∑36
i=5 Fi,
and the means are given by XL =
1
48L
∑
j
∑36
i=5 xij , and YL =
1
48L
∑
j
∑36
i=5 yij . For contact aggression
received, the fight sizes are 2, 3, 4, and > 4. For redirected aggression received, the fight sizes are 3, 4,
>4. By definition, there can be no redirected aggression in fights of size two.
Measuring cost with respect to all individuals in the population rather than conditioning the calcu-
lation only on the individuals who fight allows us to capture the consequences to the group of variation
in the individual proclivity to fight as well as in strategy variation. All else being equal, the population
cost of 10 individuals fighting in a group of 10 is higher than the cost of 10 individuals fighting in a group
of 100. Second, by considering redirected aggression, we capture how conflict size affects the likelihood
that an individual uninvolved in the dispute will be drawn in.
As shown in Fig. 5 we find, using a paired Wilcoxon signed ranks test, significantly more contact
aggression is received by group members when fights are of size 3 than when fights are of size 2 (one-tailed,
n = 48, p < 0.001), when fights are of size 4 than when fights are of size 3 (one-tailed, n = 48, p < 0.001),
and when fights are of size > 4 than when they are of size 4 (one-tailed, n = 48, p < 0.001). Note
that the relation between contact aggression received and fight size is nontrivial: aggressors need not
use contact aggression and some individuals participate without using or receiving aggression (Methods).
Consequently, contact aggression received does not necessarily increase with increasing fight size. Using
a paired Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test we also find significantly more redirected aggression is received by
group members when fights are of size 4 than when they are of size 3 (one-tailed, n = 48, p < 0.05), and
when fights are of size > 4 than when they are of size 4 (one-tailed, n = 48, p < 0.001).
These results, in conjunction with the results reported in Fig. 4, suggest that conflict decision-making
strategies based on triadic memory are associated with a higher population cost than decision-making
strategies based on pair-wise memory. Whether this cost is outweighed by the direct benefits of playing
these strategies is a question for future work.
How Specific are Strategies?
The model C(2, 1) is triadic; an individual makes a decision to join the present fight depending on the
participation of a particular pair of individuals in the previous fight. For each individual, our simulations
associate a particular probability with every single pair.
The actual strategies are likely to be far less specific. Cognitive and perceptual constraints mean that
a pair might have been perceived as “Fred and Mary” or – at a much lower degree of specificity – as “Any
8Male and Mary.” A decision-maker’s response might also not be so fined graded; instead of a continuum
of probabilities, only a finite number of distinct probabilities might be allowed.
In addition to showing the effect of cognitive and biological constraints, studying strategy specificity
is important for future work, since by reducing the dimensionality of the space, it could allow direct
maximum likelihood searches (see, e.g., [32].)
We consider two variants of C(2, 1)+AND that are less specific. These are Shuffled and Coarse-Grained.
For clarity, we will sometimes refer to the original model as Base.
The Shuffled models are alterations of Base that re-assign strategies to the group. As with the base
model, each individual maintains a static set of strategies from fight to fight. However, the sets used are
shuffled compared to the base; we consider three kinds of shuffles.
A Total Shuffle takes all the combinations AB → C, and randomly reassigns ∆P values to them
from the original set. An Outgoing Shuffle is shown schematically in Fig. 6. For each of the 48 × 47/2
incoming pairs AB, it randomly swaps the ∆P associated with two outgoing elements. The distribution
of the 48 ∆P values for any particular pair AB remains constant. When possible, the swaps are done
between pairs with strategies of opposite sign. An Incoming Shuffle is similar, but for incoming pairs; a
particular outgoing individual C has the same distribution of ∆P , but they are now randomly associated
with different pairs than in the original set.
The Coarse-Grained models are, like the base and Shuffled, also C(2, 1)+AND. The particular associa-
tions between pairs and individuals are maintained, but the values of ∆P are now coarse-grained to the
nearest of a limited set of 2n + 1 values. For n of one, only three values are allowed: ∆P equal to the
average of all the negative ∆P , equal to zero, or equal to the average of all the (strictly) positive ∆P
values. The example of n of two, with two negative and two positive values of ∆P allowed, is shown
as dotted lines in panel two of Fig. 4 in the Supporting Information. Given the data indicating that
Macaque perceptual systems have a logarithmic bias [33], we space the bins logarithmically between the
min and max of the positive and negative ranges.
Testing the coarse-grained models gives a sense of how calibrated an individual’s response needs to
be to reproduce the data. As n gets larger, the coarse-grained models are closer and closer to the base
model in terms of the underlying ∆P values that dictate the responses of individuals to different pairs.
One can consider n a measure of how “graded” an individual’s responses to a particular pair might be.
If n is two, for example, it suggests that individuals class pairs into five categories – “don’t care” (zero),
“avoid” and “strongly avoid”, and “join” and “strongly join” – with no finer distinction.
Earlier in this section, the long fraction alone was sufficient to rule out alternative strategies. The
long fractions for the different shuffled strategies, shown in Fig. 7, also have worse χ2 values. There are,
of course, many more observables than simply the fight size distribution, and we now consider a large set
of them. They are (see the Supporting Information) P (A) and Pc(AB), individual and (connected) pair
appearance probability; n¯(A) and n¯(AB), average fight size conditional on individual or pair appearance;
and ∆P (A→ B). In Table 1, we show the Pearson cross-correlation between the observed data, and the
simulations, for the different shuffles and coarse-grainings.
We may also make preliminary estimates of the change in likelihood ∆L from the data; we find that
the overall likelihood for the parameters drops with either shuffling or coarse-graining. The use of shuffled
models also allows us to make a (very preliminary) assessment of the “true” number of free parameters
in the model, and to penalize the more complicated models; this is discussed in the Model Complexity
section of the Supporting Information.
Evidence for Different Strategy Classes
The base model for which we find support assumes every individual relies solely on C(2, 1)+AND. Although
it is likely that some of the inconsistency with the data can be removed iteratively through corrections
to the ∆P ’s as part of a high-dimensional search using an approach similar to Ref. [34], it is worthwhile
asking whether some subset of individuals and pairs, chosen in a biologically-principled fashion, are better
9reproduced than others. In other words, are there subsets of individuals that are particularly triadic, and
other subsets that either care less about triadic relations or make poorer discriminations?
We illustrate here how our methods allow one to investigate this question. Individual properties (e.g.
sex, age, power scores, etc.) can be used to group individuals into categories. We can then ask how well
individuals in a particular category are fit by the Base model. This can be done by considering for all
individuals in the category of interest the two P (A) and n¯(A) measurements, the 94 Pc(AB) and n¯(AB)
measurements, and the 95 ∆P (A→ B) measurements, and estimating the goodness of fit by computing
the associated L/n.
By sorting the individuals into groups based on various extrinsic characteristics, we can determine
whether there is evidence for the employment of strategies other than the triadic model of C(2, 1)+AND.
Here, as an illustration of the method, we sort individuals by power score. The power score, discussed in
detail in Ref. [4], is an estimate of how much ‘consensus’ there is among individuals in the group about
whether the receiver is capable of using force successfully during fights. Power structure changes the
cost of social interactions, facilitating the evolution of intrinsically costly interactions, like policing [9],
by supporting a proto-division of labor in which powerful individuals police and low-power individuals
do not. Power structure can thus change the strategies individuals play. We expect this variation to
influence the extent to which individuals play C(2, 1).
We find that the highest power individuals, and the lowest power individuals, are the least-well fit
by the data, suggesting that they are using different strategies from those in C(2, 1)+AND that reproduce
much of the behavior of the intermediate-power individuals. This is shown graphically in Fig. 8, where
the individuals are sorted into groups of eight in order of decreasing power score.
Discussion
In this paper we have investigated the causes and properties of conflict in a complex social system. To
conduct this investigation we developed a new conceptual and statistical framework applied to conflict
time series, which we call Inductive Game Theory (IGT.) IGT allows the researcher to computationally
extract from data candidate strategies individuals employ to make decisions, and to study using perturba-
tions the effects of alternative strategies on collective dynamics. IGT takes temporally-varying interaction
networks as input, and uses these as the basis for a statistical reconstruction of putative, causal networks.
These causal network can be used to simulate conditions of conflict, validated against observational data
out of sample. Standard, deductive models for the analysis of conflict are not designed to deal with large
data sets, and traditionally assume that strategies, payoffs and equilibria can be defined in advance of
observation.
We have applied IGT to a time series in which there are multiple conflicts involving multiple players,
and higher-order interactions – a neglected feature of many gregarious societies, including nonhuman
primates, cetaceans, and humans [22], in which multiple individuals interact at once. We are able to
reproduce a number of features of collective behavior, including fight sizes. We discover that the triplet
of interacting individuals is an irreducible causal unit for conflict. This is surprising as the pairwise
interaction is commonly assumed to be sufficient to explain strategic behavior.
IGT can be thought of as a complement to a range of statistical, network reconstruction techniques.
For example, in genetics, temporal, expression profiles are treated as inputs, and interaction, or transcrip-
tional, networks the desired output (see, e.g., Ref. [35].) In IGT we have knowledge of the interactions
and seek to derive the collective dynamics, whereas in gene expression, the dynamics are observed, and
the interactions are estimated. IGT is also related also to studies of neural networks that invoke a Ising-
model structure to model correlations in the timing of neuronal firings [34, 36]; we differ in that our
model invokes a causal process in an out-of-equilibrium system instead of a maximum entropy distribu-
tion at fixed temperature. All of these techniques attempt to devise algorithmic approaches to pattern
discovery in rich data sets. It is largely the absence of such data in social dynamics that has favored
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the development of simple models that explain qualitative features of behavior. Whereas IGT has been
applied to conflict in this project, there is nothing preventing these ideas being applied to a wider range
of collective behavioral sequences, to include prosocial or cooperative behavior, communication, and even
coordinated, motor sequences.
Implications for Social Evolution
Behavior and Cognition
We find that the primary cause of conflicts in a multiplayer, primate population is individuals responding
to the social interactions among others. Neither pair-wise decision-making, nor immediate competition
for resources, can account for the conflict patterns we observe in the empirical data. Conflicts are
not independent events but are related in time through individual memory for previous conflicts and
participants. This effect holds despite peaceful periods, defined by the absence of all overt conflict,
separating fights lasting from a few seconds to more than an hour. We expect memory will play a role
in wild populations, although the signal might be noisier as a result of ecological stressors not present in
captivity.
Identifying strategies individuals use in deciding to fight requires introducing what we have called a
class of minimal models for social reasoning. These models vary in several important respects. One is
whether the memory underlying the decision to fight is dyadic or triadic. That individuals primarily use
triadic strategies, coupled to the fact that these strategies are not reducible to pair-wise interactions,
provides further support for the role of triadic awareness in primate social behavior [37–42].
A second way in which the models vary, is whether joint action is required. The models we considered
were of the form C(n,m), where n refers to the number and identity of individuals in the previous conflict
and m refers to the number and identity of individuals in the conflict. When m > 1, m individuals jointly
decide to fight in response to n. Joint action implies coordination. It is likely that the C(n,m) models
in which m > 1 make greater cognitive and spatial demands on the decision-makers than those models
for which m = 1. That we found little support for the C(1, 2) strategy is perhaps explained by these
increased cognitive and spatial demands [31].
A third way the models vary is whether the decision-maker is conflict-averse or conflict prone. Our
models assume that a decision-maker decides to fight based on its response to individuals or pairs fighting
at the previous time step. However, because conflicts can involve multiple pairs, it is possible that the
previous fight included both pairs who trigger a join response as well as pairs who trigger an avoid
response. To deal with these potential decision-making conflicts, we introduced a binary combinator
term that specified whether a decision-maker needed a unanimous “recommendation (AND) to join or
could be pushed over the edge to join by a single recommendation (OR). Models with an AND combinator
we interpreted as conflict-averse strategies whereas models with OR combinators we interpreted as conflict-
prone strategies.
Although this binary combinator is crude it roughly captures how a spectrum of temperaments [43] and
neuro-endocrine profiles might influence decision-making strategies by individuals and their implications
for collective conflict dynamics. In the relatively conciliatory [44] pigtailed macaque society we study,
it is not surprising that the model supported by the data was C(2, 1)+AND as individuals in this species
appear less conflict prone than, for example, individuals in rhesus (Macaca mulatta) groups [44]. We
hypothesize that macroscopic variation in aggression across primate societies [28] reflects variation in the
composition of the fundamental microscopic strategies we have identified inductively. If so, a conflict
prone tuning term can explain why in some societies we observe frequent aggression-generated mortality,
group fission, and, in captivity, cage wars [45].
A further cognitive issue raised by these results concerns how much information individuals use to
make decisions. Individuals might tune their strategies to individual identity, responding differently to
each group member, or more approximately, resolve individuals into classes such as males and females.
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Analogously, behavior can be either discrete or continuous – with highly tuned responses, or graded
responses along the lines of ‘strongly avoid’, ‘avoid’, ‘join’ and ‘strongly join.’
The procedure of coarse-graining used in the Results section, ”How Specific are the Strategies,” sug-
gests that whereas decision-makers have graded rather than continuously varying responses to individuals,
they also retain quite fine distinctions between the pairs they react to. These results are consistent with
studies of primate cognition showing that individuals can identify other individuals, have the capacity to
form numerical representations and discriminate between highly similar vocalizations [46], can discrim-
inate among emotional states and facial expressions [47, 48], and have some knowledge of the rank or
relative power of other group members [37, 38, 49].
Modeling the Role of Conflict in Evolutionary Processes
There are two primary challenges faced by all complex evolving systems. One is an uncertain, noisy
environment. The other – the topic of this paper – is conflict. Conflict arises when the interests of system
components – whether genes, cells, individuals, or states – are not fully aligned. Conflict is one of the
most important social factor shaping the evolution of living systems (for many examples, see Ref. [3]) and
is thought to have played a prominent role in the evolution of cooperation [50,51]. Some suggest that lack
of alignment, or “frustration”, in many-body systems is the defining feature of all complex systems [52].
Theoretical studies of conflict in particular have proceeded deductively, employing simple models to
generate important intuitions about how payoffs select in evolutionary time stable strategies individuals
play. In these models there typically is no distinction between evolutionary time and ontogenetic time
as the ontogenetic dynamics are either considered transient (timescale too fast to be relevant) or fitness
is a simple multiple of payoff. Here we have shown that immediate resource competition does not,
at least directly, drive conflict in ontogenetic time in systems with multi-party conflict interactions.
Memory for social interactions shapes the strategies individuals employ when deciding to fight, and can
generate costly collective conflict dynamics , thereby influencing the evolution of conflict management.
The particular strategy used by the individuals in our study group, C(2, 1)+AND, requires that individuals
respond to pairs. Compared to other strategies the individuals could be playing, this triadic strategy
induces potentially manageable but not insignificant conflict cascades. We found also found that different
strategies have different implications for cascade size and severity, and that larger fights are on average
more costly at the population level. These results suggest that the costs and benefits of playing a
particular strategy filter back to group members through collective behavior over relatively long timescales
of multiple conflicts, as well as directly. It is not clear whether a single integrated payoff can capture
these effects.
In addition to the relation between conflict dynamics and resource competition, our work has consid-
ered the role of dynamical interaction structure. In evolutionary game theory, interactions are typically
pair-wise or, in n-person treatments, effectively pair-wise as higher-order strategic interactions tend to
be neglected in the mean field [16]. Our finding that the causal unit of conflict dynamics is the triad,
not the individual nor the pair, suggests that individual agency has been overemphasized in social evo-
lution. It also suggests that cooperative form and hybrid games [53, 54] could come to play a central
role when studying competitive and cooperative interactions. A cooperative form game (in contrast to
a noncooperative form game – the standard form in most of evolutionary game theory) is one in which
individuals form higher-order units, typically through binding contracts, and play against others through
these “coalitions”. The mathematical definition of coalition is effectively highly correlated constituents;
cooperative mechanisms are not required. The interaction structure of these games, as well as that of
hybrid games, appears well-suited to studying the stability properties of the strategies our results suggest
individuals are playing.
Finally, using IGT it is possible to computationally extract from data a space of plausible strategies
and to study their implications for collective conflict dynamics without positing payoffs. This makes IGT
a good complement to standard game theory, which despite its generative power, is well recognized to
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be weakly tied to natural-system data [27] and limited by somewhat unrealistic assumptions concerning
stationary pay-offs.
Along with climate change and poverty, conflict is perhaps the most important contemporary challenge
to the integrity of human society and to improving individual quality of life. Yet in many respects little is
understood about conflict, particularly its causes and dynamics over the life time of an individual. This is
because biologists to date have emphasized costs and benefits of conflict in evolutionary time (measured
over many generations). The detailed analysis of ontogenetic conflict should provide insights into the
behavioral raw material and variability upon which evolutionary dynamics – both neutral and selective
– operates.
Empirical Methods
Model System
Macaque societies are characterized by social learning at the individual level, social structures that arise
from nonlinear processes and feedback to influence individual behavior, frequent non-kin interactions and
multiplayer conflict interactions, the cost and benefits of which can be quantified at the individual and
social network levels [4,5,9,28,29,44,49,55]. These properties coupled to highly resolved data make this
system an excellent one for drawing inferences about critical processes in social evolution as well as for
developing new modeling approaches that are intended to apply more broadly.
In this study we focus on one species in the genus, the pigtailed macaque (Macaca nemestrina).
The data set, collected by J.C. Flack, is from a large, captive, breeding group of pigtailed macaques
that was housed at the Yerkes National Primate Research Center in Lawrenceville, Georgia. Pigtailed
macaques have frequent conflict and employ targeted intervention and repair strategies for managing
conflict [9]. The study group had a demographic structure approximating wild populations. Subadult
males were regularly removed to mimic emigration occurring in wild populations. The group contained
84 individuals, including 4 adult males, 25 adult females, and 19 subadults (totaling 48 socially-mature
individuals used in the analyses). All individuals, except 8 (4 males, 4 females), were either natal to the
group or had been in the group since formation. The group was housed in an indoor-outdoor facility, the
outdoor compound of which was 125 x 65 ft.
Pigtailed macaques are indigenous to south East Asia and live in multi-male, multi-female societies
characterized by female matrilines and male group transfer upon onset of puberty [56]. Pigtailed macaques
breed all year. Females develop swellings when in Œstrus.
Data Collection Protocol
During observations all individuals were confined to the outdoor portion of the compound and were visible
to the observer. The ≈ 158 hours of observations occurred for up to eight hours daily between 1,100 and
2,000 hours over a twenty-week period from June until October 1998 and were evenly distributed over the
day. Provisioning occurred before observations, and once during observations. The data were collected
over a four-month period during which the group was stable (defined as no reversals in status signaling
interactions resulting in a change to an individual’s power score, see [49]).
Conflict and power (subordination signal) data were collected using an all-occurrence sampling pro-
cedure [57] in which the compound was repeatedly scanned from left to right for onset of conflict or the
occurrence of silent-bared teeth displays (used to measure power, see below). The entire conflict event
was then followed, including start time, end time, and the identity of individuals involved as aggressors,
recipients, or interveners (see below for operational definitions). Although conflicts in this study group
can involve many individuals, participation is typically serial, making it possible to follow the sequence
of interactions. A nearly complete time-series of conflict events is available for each observation period.
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Breaks in data collection during the day occurred sufficiently rarely (seldom more than once a day), and
were sufficiently short (seldom more than fifteen minutes), that results changed little from when correla-
tions were computed assuming no activity during breaks, to not including any fight pairs separated by a
break in correlation estimators. We avoided altogether using fight pairs with fights on different days.
Instantaneous scan sampling [57] occurred every 15 min for state behaviours (here, grooming).
Operational Definitions
Grooming: passing hands or teeth through hair of another individual or plucking the hair with hands or
teeth for a minimum of five seconds.
Conflict: includes any interaction in which one individual threatens or aggresses a second individual. A
conflict was considered terminated if no aggression or withdrawal responses (fleeing, crouching, screaming,
running away, submission signals) occurred for two minutes from the last such event. A conflict can involve
multiple pairs if pair-wise conflicts result in aggressive interventions by third parties or redirections by
at least one conflict participant. In addition to aggressors, a conflict can include individuals who show
no aggression (e.g. recipients or third-parties who either only approach the conflict or show affiliative /
submissive behavior upon approaching, see [58].) Because conflicts involve multiple players two or more
individuals can participate in the same conflict but not interact directly.
Contact aggression: aggression received by one group member from another that involves grappling,
tumbling, hitting, slapping, or biting.
Power-disparity: difference between two individuals in their power scores. Power scores for each
individual in this study were calculated using a procedure described in [49]. In brief, the total frequency
of peacefully-emitted subordination signals received by an individual over a given duration (in this case,
the study duration, which was approximately four months) is corrected for the uniformity (measured
using Shannon entropy) of its distribution of signals received from its population of potential senders (all
socially-mature individuals). This equation quantifies how much consensus there is among individuals in
the group about whether the receiver is capable of using force successfully during fights.
Redirected aggression: aggression or threat directed from a conflict participant towards a third-party
during or within 5 seconds of the conflict.
Subordination signal: the subordination signal in the pigtailed macaque communication repertoire is
the silent bared-teeth display [58]. Bared-teeth (BT) displays are marked by a retraction of the lips and
mouth corners such that the teeth are partially bared. In pigtailed macaques, the SBT occurs in two
contexts: peaceful and agonistic SBT see [58]) Signals in both contexts are highly unidirectional. The
agonistic SBT encodes submission. The peaceful variant signals agreement to primitive social contract in
which the signaler has the subordinate role [58]. The network of SBT interactions encodes information
about power structure [49].
Statistical Analyses of Empirical Data
In the results of the main paper, we presented results obtained using Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Tests on
two measures of cost, contact aggression received and redirected aggression received. We preformed
multiple (three for contact aggression received and two for redirected aggression) independent Wilcoxon
tests per cost measure instead of one overall Friedman test (nonparametric version of repeated measures)
per measure because the post hoc planned comparison tests associated with the Friedman test typically
do not have enough power to detect differences across treatments. We performed nonparametric tests
rather than parametric tests because our data violated the homogeneity of variance assumption.
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Figure 1. Conflict event time-series data from one observation period. Begins at 12:00 hours,
and ends just after 20:00 hours. Plotted on the y-axis as “Total Fight Size” is the number of conflict
participants per conflict, regardless of whether the participant was an aggressor, recipient, or intervener.
The graph gives a sense of the distribution of conflict sizes, and conflict lengths, and the distribution of
intervening peaceful periods. Hatched bars indicate periods without data collection.
Table 1. Pearson correlation coefficients for the model variants.
Model P (A) Pc(AB) n¯(A) n¯(AB) ∆P
ρ A→ B
Base 0.62 0.51 0.80 0.37 0.50
Shuffled
Total 0.013 -0.007 0.17 0.20 -0.026
Outgoing 0.17 0.034 0.12 0.19 0.035
Incoming 0.75 -0.053 0.036 0.13 -0.15
Coarse Grained
n = 1 0.11 0.43 0.34 0.27 0.42
n = 2 0.59 0.47 0.60 0.34 0.47
n = 4 0.49 0.49 0.75 0.36 0.48
In nearly all cases, the model outperforms the various “shuffled” alternatives, indicating that the triadic
nature of the strategies is central to conflict dynamics. The effect of coarse graining the strategies is to
reduce correlations; as the number of levels increases and thus finer distinctions are made, the effects
disappear. The data suggest that n = 2 (two positive, and two negative, levels) are sufficient to
reproduce much of the group structure.
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Figure 2. The network of the strongest correlations detected in the data set, shown as
directed edges between individuals. ∆P (as defined in Eq. 1) positive is denoted as a solid line,
and ∆P negative as a dashed line; arrows denote the forward direction of time. Edges with |∆P | above
6% (at 95% confidence) are shown; note that detections of different edges are not independent. Node
color indicates frequency, with blue meaning rare in fights, and red, frequent.
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Figure 3. Lattice classification of strategy space. All strategies live in the space of 1-step Markov
transition functions. Starting with the simplest model class C(1, 1), we can add individuals to either the
first or second fight, systematically building up strategies of increasing complexity based on cognitive,
coordination, and computational requirements.
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Figure 4. Individuals play triadic, not pairwise, strategies, and it is this triadic
decision-making that produces turbulent periods. This plot shows the distribution of fight sizes
in the real data (red line) and the simulated distributions under each C(2, 1) hypothesis. We plot the
“long fraction,” the number of fights of a certain size, divided by the number of fights larger than two
participants. In green is shown the 95% confidence contours for C(1, 1)+OR; the model is unable to
generate conflicts of sizes much larger than three. The stricter variant, C(1, 1)+AND, performs even more
poorly. In orange is shown C(2, 1)+OR. Its distribution has a significant fraction of conflicts larger than
eight individuals. In yellow is C(1, 2)+AND. Even though this is the “conflict-averse” variant of C(1, 2),
it produces many large fights over time such that the distribution is “inverted” and there are more large
fights than small fights. C(1, 2) with the more “conflict prone” OR combinator produces even larger
cascades that grow so quickly good statistics become computationally impossible. Dark blue is the 95%
contour and light blue is the 68% contour for the distribution generated by C(2, 1)+AND, the only model
that can capture important features of the data. This triadic strategy cannot be decomposed into
pairwise strategies.
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Figure 5. Large fights cost more. Plot A shows box plots for the mean frequency of redirected
aggression received per individual for conflicts of a given size. Plot B shows box plots for the mean
frequency of contact aggression received per individual for conflicts of a given size. Conflict sizes were
binned so that each category contained an approximately equivalent number of events and to reflect
natural categories (e.g. pairs and triplets). The heavy black horizontal line in each plot shows the
median “mean value”. The bottom and top of the box give the 25th and 75th percentiles, respectively.
The vertical dashed lines show 1.5 times the interquartile range (roughly two standard deviations). The
points are outliers, defined as 1.5 times the interquartile range above the third quartile. Note that
redirection, by definition, is not possible in conflicts smaller than triplets. Adjacent pairs of fight sizes
were compared using the Wilcoxon signed ranks test to determine whether the probability of aggression
received increases with fight size. The stars indicate the level of significance for differences between
adjacent fight sizes.
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Figure 6. A schematic illustration of one of the Triadic tests – the Outgoing Shuffle. For the
incoming pair AB, two outgoing names (here, C and D) are chosen. The values of the two associated
∆P , ∆P (AB → C) and ∆P (AB → D), are swapped. New names are chosen and the process repeated
until all the ∆P s associated with the AB incoming pair have been reassigned. This then is done for all
48× 47/2 possible incoming pairs, and the resultant ∆P set used to generate conflict cascades.
21
Figure 7. The sensitivity of the Long Fraction to C(2, 1)+AND model variants. 68% confidence
are shown. In blue is the base model. In orange, a simulation based on strategies that have been
shuffled relative to the base model (Total Shuffle.) In green is a simulation based on strategies where
only the incoming pairs have been shuffled relative to the base model (Incoming Shuffle.) In red are the
data. Both variants of the base, reliant on triadic decision-making, lie nearer to the data than those
strategies of Fig. 4, but still neither are a better fit to the data.
Figure 8. Going beyond triadic discrimination. Overall L/n as a function of power score,
showing how the highest and lowest-power groups are fit least well by the C(2, 1)+AND strategy
assumptions. The 48 individuals are here grouped into units of eight by similarity in power score.
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Aggregate Properties of the Time Series
To explore how memory might influence collective conflict dynamics, we determine the scales of aggrega-
tion in our study group at which significant correlations in conflict properties occur. We test for spurious
correlations, which can arise without memory if the same individuals repeatedly engage in conflict simply
because they have an aggressive disposition or if particular individuals repeatedly agitate others.
We first consider the simple case of correlations across fights in the number of individuals involved
without regard to identity – for example, whether large fights follow large fights. We find that, for a
wide range of such statistics involving both the median and mean, and different nulls, that there are no
detectable correlations of this sort. This section elaborates on that finding.
Consider the statistic “median over-under correlation,” an average taken over all fight pairs separated
by time ∆t, which can be defined and computed with ensemble averages:
M(∆t) = 〈Θ(N [t]− N¯)Θ(N [t+∆t]− N¯)〉, (5)
where the angle-bracket average is taken over the entire dataset but no pairs with fights on different days
are considered. Here Θ is a step-function: -1 for negative argument and +1 for positive argument. In the
case where the fight size of one of the pairs happens to be precisely the median value, i.e., the argument
is zero, we take the Θ function to be (n−m)/(n+m), where n is the number of fights with length strictly
above the median value, and m the number of fights strictly below the median value. The time, t, and
lag, ∆t, are in units of fights within a day; for example, t of five means the fifth fight that day.
The average fight size, N¯ , can computed within a day or across days. We find evidence for intra-day
variation associated with feeding times and onset of evening hours; however, using a time-dependent
N¯ complicates analysis without changing any qualitative aspects of the results, and so we do not use
this correction. Put simply, then M(∆t) estimates how likely a fight of above-median (equivalently,
below-median) size is expected to be found after a previous fight also of above-median (below-median)
size.
Any correlation statistic such as M will, in general, be non-zero for a particular data set – even if the
data were generated by a completely uncorrelated process. In order to determine the significance level of
a detection, we must compare to a null model. Here our null model is a shuffled time-series that leaves
the internal properties of the fights unchanged. This null has the advantage of efficiently ensuring that
detections will be sensitive to purely time-correlated aspects of the data, and not – for example – to the
“zero-lag” correlations that occur within a single fight or on average. In general, we find our statistics
insensitive to whether this shuffling is done within a day – i.e., keeping same day events on the same day
but rearranging their order – or across all days.
As shown in Fig. 9, there is no evidence for memory of previous interactions when considering only
fight size data. Conflicts at this coarse-graining appear to occur at random. Furthermore, the correlations
of fight sizes, fight durations, and peace durations with themselves and with each other (variations of
M(∆t) sensitive to, for example, whether a long peace follows a small fight) all appear largely independent
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Figure 9. Fight size, an aggregate-level variable, does not predict future fight size. A
coarse-grained correlation function, M(∆t), of the time series. At lag of zero, M is unity by definition;
at non-zero lag, M is indistinguishable from the null model with zero time correlation – the 68%
confidence range for this null is shown as the dashed line. The null model is generated by time shuffling
fight bouts.
of previous events. This result is robust regardless of whether we examine the correlation function in
real space or, conversely, in Fourier space where longer baseline trends, such as those involving a small
random walk component, might have become apparent.
The distribution of fight sizes is a central part of our study; as shown in the “Conflict Cost” subsection
of the Results, it has important consequences for individuals as well as the group as a whole. Larger fights
lead to greater amounts of injury and aggression; meanwhile, the consequences of different strategies for
fight size distributions are shown in Figs. 4 and 7 of the main paper. Here, we plot the distribution of all
fight fight sizes (on a linear scale) in Fig. 10 (overleaf); in Fig. 11 we plot the distribution for the subset of
those fights that include the most common fight participant (individual name Eocene, codename “Eo.”)
Individuals and Subgroups in the Time Series
At a finer level of resolution we consider correlations across fights in membership considering all 48
socially-mature individuals. This co-occurrence time-series describes which individuals, pairs, and higher-
n groups of individual appeared together in fights, regardless of their behavior.
Because our choice of null conserves the properties of individual fights, N(A) is the same for both the
data and the nulls. Given a sufficiently large set of Monte Carlo realizations of the null, we can determine
which pairs of individuals have significant time correlations – i.e., have a ∆P sufficiently positive or
negative that the ∆P is shared by less than, e.g., 5% of all Monte Carlo realizations of the null model.
Considering only the group’s 48 socially-mature individuals, there are 2,304 possible correlations of
the form ∆P (A → B). Results are shown in the (implicitly) causal network in Fig. 2. Many of the
strongest correlations are positive, meaning that individuals attract one another to subsequent conflicts,
rather than negative, which would mean individuals are inhibited from appearing after certain other
individuals appeared.
It is striking the extent to which the absence of signal at the most coarse-grained level of the conflict
time-series, Fig. 9, conceals a rich set of correlations once individual identities are considered, Fig. 2.
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Figure 10. Distribution of fight sizes in the data set. Maximum fight size is 36, mean is 3.7,
median is 3.
Figure 11. Distribution of fight sizes in the data set, for those fights including the most
common individual, code name “Eo” (Eocene.) maximum is 36, mean is 5.6, median is 4.
As mentioned, however, extracting overall significance levels for ∆P measurements requires caution. For
example, since individuals are correlated within fights, and these correlations are maintained by the null
model, the various ∆P measurements are not independent of each other.
The effects of these correlations can be seen when comparing the analysis done on the data to that
performed on a shuffled version of the data. Taking only those cases where N(B|A) is larger (or smaller)
than 95% of Nnull(B|A) found, there are 513 detections of non-zero ∆P in the data. There are however
approximately 480 “detections” out of 2304 ∆P (A→ B) for the shuffled data – if the different N(B|A)
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were perfectly independent, this should be a factor of two lower.
Detections of the positive ∆P alone are more reliable; we find 296 ∆P values larger than zero in the
data, compared to an average of 212 in shuffled datasets, for an overall p < 0.001. When we come to
consider the two-step correlations, the ∆P can not be distinguished from the noise we expect from the
internal correlations of the null model. We defer more detailed discussion of these issues to later work.
The distributions of ∆P (A → B), ∆P (AB → C), and ∆P (A → BC) are shown in Fig. 12; these
statistics will play a central role in modeling the group, and in assessing how well the model reproduces
the group behavior. In Fig. 13 we show the distribution of the “absolute” probabilities P from which the
∆P are derived (P (A→ B) is equal to N(B|A)/N(A), and so forth.)
The null here, recall, is the average from a large Monte Carlo set of null models generated by time-
shuffling the series but leaving fight compositions intact. It corresponds to a Markov process where the
group has a particular set of conflicts of different compositions that it visits in a biased but uncorrelated
fashion. It can be thought of as drawing a fully specified fight from an urn without replacement.
It is possible to consider relaxing the null model further, so that, for example, individuals join fights
with a probability independent of the other members of the group; in this case, one assembles a fight
by drawing, with probabilities P (A), N individuals, where N might be, for example, drawn from the
observed distribution of fight sizes. Such a model destroys many of the correlations, internal to a fight,
that are detectable in the time-averaged properties of the data.
This can be seen in Fig. 14, which compares the observed joint probability, P (AB), and the probability
expected if individuals appeared independently of each other, P (A)P (B). A two-sided Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test finds the two distributions different with p ≪ 10−6. Such strong rejections of nulls that
ignore correlations between individuals are a general feature of our system, which is strongly correlated
both within and between fights.
Simulation Specification
For a strategy class C(n,m), we specify two things. First the probabilities, associated with a particular n-
and m-tuple 1, that the n-tuple recommend the m-tuple “join,” or “avoid” the subsequent fight. In our
study here, we do not develop algorithms to search and “fit out” the many thousand-dimensional space,
but make a good first guess to associate the measurable ∆P from the simulations with these probabilities.
A positive ∆P for a particular n and m-tuple pair is read as a probability to generate a recommendation
to join. A negative ∆P is read as the negative of the probability of a recommendation to avoid.
A ∆P of zero (i.e., a ∆P that could not be detected above a particular confidence level) never
generates a recommendation; in many cases, the confidence level requirement zeros out ∆P s that may be
formally large – this is because we exclude measurements of a particular ∆P that rely on two or fewer
instances of fight pairs.
We have checked and find our results insensitive to reasonable changes in the ∆P cutoff – either in
amplitude or in the number of observations required to establish it. The dynamics of conflict are largely
driven by the tuples with easily measured, larger ∆P .
For each possible m-tuple in the population, we “roll the dice” for all the n-tuples in the previous
fight. For example, for a fight with four participants, there are four 1-tuples, six 2-tuples, four 3-tuples,
and one 4-tuple. If we are considering a strategy of C(2, 1), we are concerned with the six 2-tuples,
and we will have, for each of them, either a recommendation to join, a recommendation to avoid, or no
recommendation at all, for each of the 48 possible outgoing 1-tuples.
The next step is to combine these. We consider two simple choices of combinator. The recommenda-
tions can combined with an AND function, requiring a ‘recommendation to join’ from all relevant n-tuples
at the previous step; here ‘relevant’ means “with a non-zero ∆P”. Or, the recommendations can be
1Note that we use “tuple” here informally, to mean an unordered set of a particular size.
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combined with an OR function, i.e., needing at least one n-tuple in the previous time step to recommend
‘yes.’
An interpretation of the AND rule is conservatism – that individuals who require many recommenda-
tions, or recommendations from all previous conflict participants, to join a subsequent fight are conflict
averse. In contrast, an interpretation of OR is that individuals who require one or only a few recommen-
dations are pushed over the edge more easily – they are conflict prone.
Given both a model and a combinator, we can now simulate the group’s conflict dynamics. We start
with a seed pair drawn from the distribution of pairs in the data (we take the distribution of “fights with
only two individuals”, rather than P (AB), but find our results largely insensitive to this choice.) We
evaluate the strategies for each individual in the group to determine the composition of the next fight.
At some point, a particular fight will, through the propagation effects generated by playing particular
strategies, lead to no recommendations for subsequent m-tuples to join. At that point, the “cascade” is
terminated, and a new seed is chosen. As shown in Table 2, we consider six different possibilities within
the simplest subset of cognitively plausible models.
Our model is not exhaustive, and there are a number of “limit cases.” Many of them focus on how
to handle joint “avoid” and “join” recommendations for the same m-tuple. In the OR combinator case,
for instance, does the appearance of a single “avoid” recommendation force the tuple to avoid the next
fight, or is it overruled by a single “join” recommendation? We find that the role of the negative ∆P s is
very minor; in particular, it is rare that a recommendation to avoid frustrates the appearance of a tuple
that received recommendations to join from other tuples. This seems to indicate that non-appearance in
a fight is associated more with disinterest, rather than active decisions based on fear or calculation that
lead to successful avoidance.
Another limit case is the situation in which an individual receives a recommendation to join, but
no other individual does: the individual “can find nobody who wants to fight.” This might depict a
behavioral reality, or, conversely, it might indicate the need for new dynamical rules; the single individual
may be able to generate conflict in ways not detectable by our segmentation of the data into “fight” and
“peace” bouts. This question is necessarily limited by our coarse-graining of the continuous and complex
sequence of events – individual expressions of aggression over a spatially extended area.
Composition Statistics
We use a set of statistics to quantify how well different variants of C(2, 1) reproduce the data. We consider
P (A), the frequency of appearance of individual A, and Pc(AB), the connected pair correlation,
Pc(AB) = P (AB)− P (A)P (B), (6)
where P (AB) is the frequency of appearance of the pair P (AB). (The use of only the connected part
reduces the covariance of the two statistics.)
We also consider n¯(A) and n¯(AB), the size of the average fight in which one finds individual A, or
pair AB, respectively:
n¯(A) =
∑48
i=2 iN(A, i)
N(A)n¯
(7)
and
n¯(AB) =
∑48
i=2 iN(AB, i)
N(AB)n¯
(8)
where n¯ is the average fight size overall, N(A, i) is the number of fights that include A of size i, and
similarly for N(AB, i). Note that we normalize n¯(A) and n¯(AB) to the average fight size so that, for
example, n¯(Q) equal to 2 means that the average fight individual Q appears in is twice the size of an
ordinary fight.
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Table 2. The implications for social stability of different strategies.
Strategy Hypothesis Combinator Avg. Max. Size Avg. Length Consequences
C(1,1) “Rogue Actor” +OR 2.03 1.15 Anomalous Quiescence
+AND 2.02 1.10 Anomalous Quiescence
C(1,2) “Triadic Coordination” +OR ∼ 40 * ≫ 102 * Forest Fire
+AND 19.9 108 Forest Fire
C(2,1) “Triadic Discrimination” +OR 5.59 3.73 Forest Fire
+AND 2.89 2.12 Manageable
The severity of conflict dynamics, either in terms of average maximum fight size, or average cascade length, varies strongly depending on
the model. Column six gives the consequences for the group of a particular model: anomalous quiescence (few large fights), forest fires
(long cascades and large fights), or “manageable” (no extremely large fights). Memory is pair-wise for C(1, 1) and is triadic for C(1, 2)
and C(2, 1). C(1, 2) requires that two individuals jointly engage in conflict at the next time step. C(1, 1) and C(2, 1) do not require joint
action. C(2, 1) requires that individuals discriminate pairs rather than just individuals. As n and m increase, cognitive burden increases
because individuals must remember more conflict participants. An asterisk indicates that fights grew so large that reliable statistics
were computationally infeasible.
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Finally, we consider the long fraction, introduced in Eq. 4 of the main paper, and the causal statistic
∆P (A→ B).
Likelihood Estimation for Model Comparison
In the main paper we used the Pearson correlation as a way to determine how well different strategies
reproduced the group’s behavior. That the base model (and coarse-grained versions with n ≥ 2) generally
outperformed the other model variants we took as evidence for the importance of the triadic nature of
the strategies.
Here, we take a further step towards quantifying the ways in which our model, and competing variants,
reproduce the data. We use the (natural) logarithm of the likelihood ratio per measured parameter, ∆L/n.
This gives an estimate of the relative likelihood of the data being produced by one model versus another.
If ∆L/n is α, then, for an average measurement, the base model is e−αn times more likely than the
variant in question.
The calculation of ∆L requires an estimate of the shape of the likelihood function, L; this is compu-
tationally infeasible to produce exactly. We thus settle for a multivariate Gaussian approximation, and
estimate the relative log-likelihoods per degree of freedom in this limit. This gives an estimate of how
more strongly preferred the base model is to its variants.
Given the predictions of a particular model we would like to quantify how well they reproduce the
data. Doing so requires us to estimate how the observables, which we write schematically as {xi}, would
change, and how those changes would be correlated with each other, were another set of observations
made of the same group under sufficiently similar conditions.
Different simulations imply different noise models, with different correlations. We estimate the in-
trinsic variation of the data from the simulations themselves, taking many sequences of length N = 1096
fights, and estimating the statistics – the various P (A), Pc(AB), n¯(A), n¯(AB) and ∆P – from them
in the same fashion as in the actual data. We thus reduce the problem to estimating the shape of the
likelihood function – the probability that a measurement drawn from a particular model H will take
the values {xi}, which we write as L({xi}|H). When there are only a few xi to measure, the function
can be sampled. Yet for the statistics of interest here, L is a function with potentially thousands of
dimensions (for example, the 1128 pairs, in the case of Pc(AB) and n¯(AB), or the 2304 tuples, in the
case of ∆P (A→ B).)
The standard solution to this problem is to expand the logarithm of the likelihood to second order
about the maximum; this amounts to approximating the distribution of the n statistics as a multivariate
Gaussian. For a simultaneous measurement of n statistics – say, for example, the 1128 pair probabilities
of a Pc(AB) measurement – the second order expansion is
L = − lnL({xi}|H)
=
n
2
ln 2pi −
1
2
detΣ +
1
2
∆iΣij∆j + . . . , (9)
where repeated indices indicate summation, ∆i is
∆i = (xi − x¯i), (10)
and x¯, the value the measurements that maximizes L, and Σ, sometimes called the precision matrix,
are a set of parameters we estimate from the simulations. The first two terms, the zeroth order part of
the expansion, are what ensure that the likelihood L is normalized properly so that
∫
L({xi})(
∏
dxi) is
unity.
We can estimate x¯ and Σ by the average values, and the inverse of their covariance matrix, of a set
of A simulation runs. It is required that A > n for the covariance matrix to be invertible. We can then
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compare two models – say, Base and Variant – by taking likelihood ratios – which is more convenient to
do in log space:
∆L = L({xDi }|Base)− LH1({x
D
i }|Variant), (11)
where {xDi } are measured from the data. The larger (more positive) ∆L, above, is, the greater the likeli-
hood of the variant; conversely, negative values of ∆L are associated with a higher likelihood attributed
to the base model.
Table 3. ∆L/n, log-likelihood per observable, relative to the Base model, for the model
variants.
Model P (A) Pc(AB) n¯(A) n¯(AB) ∆P Overall
∆L/n A→ B
Shuffled
Total -6.0 -15 -8.2 -5.5 +0.58 -6.7
Outgoing -7.9 +0.78 +3.2 -0.06 -25 -6.7
Incoming -0.61 +0.58 -13.3 -8.0 +0.37 -3.5
Coarse Grained
n = 1 -7.7 -7.3 -9.7 -2.2 -3.1 -5.3
n = 2 -2.6 -9.7 -2.3 -1.6 -2.2 -4.0
n = 4 -3.3 -7.6 +2.4 -0.12 +0.08 -2.0
For observables of pair properties such as Pc(AB), only the top 100 pairs are considered. In general,
individual log-likelihoods are negative, indicating that the base model is preferred over the variants for
different subsets of the data; the overall log-likelihoods are all negative.
Table 3 shows the results, for all 48 individuals (in the case of P (A) and n¯(A)), the top 100 tuples
(in the case of Pc(AB) and n¯(AB)), or the top 100 “ordered pairs with repetitions allowed” (in the
case of ∆P (A → B).) In general, the entries are negative, indicating that the base model has higher
likelihood than the shuffled models. In some cases, ∆L/n is positive; indicating that one of the variants
has a slightly higher-likelihood for a particular class of measurements. There is, however, no variant that
consistently outperforms the base model, and the overall log-likelihoods (computed in the approximation
that the different classes of measurements are independent) are all negative.
Model Complexity
Some of the models that fit the data poorly – in particular, the two variants of C(1, 1) – have far fewer
parameters than our favored model, C(2, 1)+AND. There are, formally, 54,144 free parameters in the latter
model, while the simpler models have only 2,304. In this section, we investigate, in two different ways,
whether the improvements in goodness-of-fit, though large, are justified in an information-theoretic sense.
Our first intuition is that many of the parameters in C(2, 1)+AND have little influence on the evolution
of the system; for example, setting some of the smaller ∆P values to zero has little effect on the evolution
of the system (see the Supporting Information model specification.) Here, we use the notion of Bayesian
complexity to estimate the true number of free parameters; we then use an information theoretic criterion
to justify our favorable assessment of C(2, 1).
Bayesian complexity (see Ref. [59] and, e.g., Ref. [60,61]) provides one way to measure the “effective”
number of free parameters, keff . It can be written
keff = 2(lnL(θˆ)− lnL(θ)), (12)
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where the overbar denotes average with respect to the posterior PDF and θˆ are the best estimates of the
parameters of the model, θ.
Without a fuller exploration of parameter space, we can not estimate lnL to great accuracy. However,
if we assume that many of our parameters will be degenerate – i.e., that our likelihood is reasonably flat
– then the average likelihood can be approximated by the likelihood at a single “average” position within
the prior distribution.
If we take as our prior only the distribution of ∆P values, then an average point in strategy space
is given by the Total shuffle, described in Results section of the main paper. We then compute the
log-likelihood for the 54,144 values of N(AB → C) (directly related to the ∆P values of the model, these
are quicker to compute.) Computing the multivariate Gaussian approximation to the likelihood function
for such a large set of parameters is computationally infeasible (it would require over 50, 000 simulation
runs), and so we approximate the likelihood as diagonal and Poissonian; because many of the observed
frequencies are small (of order one detection in a set of 100 simulation runs of 1000 fights each), we use
the functional form of the true Poisson distribution and not standard the Gaussian approximation. We
can check to see that the measured covariances are Poissonian (i.e., roughly equal to the measured mean);
they are, within the error expected for a measured covariance.
We find with this method that keff is ∼ 2000. Compared to the formal number of 54,144, this back-
of-the-envelope calculation suggests that our intuition – that many of the parameters of the model are
underdetermined and are thus not truly observable – is correct.
In general, adding more parameters will increase the goodness of fit – regardless of whether an under-
lying model requires such complexity; one may, for example, be fitting noise and not signal. There number
of information-theoretic statistical tools to penalize model complexity. The Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC; [62]), based on the relative Kullback-Leibler information, is one of the best known. Discussed in
detail in (for example) Ref. [61, 63], the AIC value is
AIC = −2 lnL+ 2K +
2K(K + 1)
N −K − 1
(13)
where K is the number of parameters in the model and N is the number of observables. A lower AIC
value is better, and indicates the preferred model (only relative AIC values are meaningful.)
We can now compare C(2, 1) with C(1, 1); in particular, we can find an lower bound on the AIC for
the C(1, 1) model by assuming its number of effective parameters to be much less than the 2000 found
for C(2, 1).
We find that lnL/N is −1.1 for C(2, 1)+AND, and −1.9 for C(1, 1)+OR; the overall difference in log-
likelihood between the two models is then ∼ 80, 000. The complexity penalty is 2K + 2K(K + 1)/(N −
K−1) ∼ 4000. This means that, despite the complexity of added parameters, C(2, 1)+AND is significantly
preferred over the simpler C(1, 1)+OR.
31
Figure 12. The distribution of correlations ∆P (A→ B), ∆P (AB → C), and ∆P (A→ BC) in
the observed data. These quantify the probability that an appearance of a particular individual or
group will be associated with a later appearance (or absence) of another individual or group. The
dotted lines, overlaid on the ∆P (AB → C) distribution, are referred to in the strategy specificity
subsection of the Results; they indicate the values to which probabilities are coarse-grained at two-level
resolution. ∆P (AB → C) values are larger since they are normalized by N(AB) and not N(A).
32
Figure 13. As in Fig. 12, but now showing the distribution of the absolute probabilities,
P (A→ B), P (AB → C) and P (A→ BC).
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Figure 14. The distribution of measured joint appearance probability, P (AB) [solid line],
and that expected in the case that individuals appear in fights independently of each other
[dotted line]. The two distributions are significantly different under the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
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